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REFLEXIVE ARGUMENT, THE HEART OF INQUISITORIAL 
PROCEDURES 
Dale Hample 
The purpose of this paper is to explore a particular argument form and to 
show its intimate connection to the procedures followed by various of the 
medieval inquisitions. The argument fonn, reflexive argument, is 
interesting in its own right, but takes on some additional importance when 
its role in inquisitorial practice is seen. 
Throughout this paper, I will speak generally of the inquisition, as 
though there were only one, and for many purposes that is clearly a 
mistake. Inquisitions existed from the earliest centuries of Christianity. 
But the inquisition that is the topic of this paper began at the end of the 
twelfth century as an official response to the Catharist heresy in southern 
France. During the thirteenth century, inquisitorial responsibilities were 
given over mainly to the Dominican and Franciscan orders, although 
bishops continued to have the requisite authority as well. Inquisitions 
tended to be occasional, somewhat sporadic, and papally initiated until the 
end of the fifteenth century, when they became more centralized. Two 
organizations arose at about that time. The Spanish Inquisition was 
formalized with papal authority in 1479 but almost immediately escaped 
from Roman oversight, becoming independent of the Pope and subservient 
to Spanish political, cultural, and religious priorities instead. 1542 saw the 
establishment of the Congregation of the Inquisition, or Holy Office, as a 
stable part of the Catholic bureaucracy, operating under the Pope's 
authority. The Spanish Inquisition formally terminated in 1820, although 
it had not been vigorous for a century or more by that time. These three 
inquisitions-the medieval, the Spanish, and the papal-constitute the 
bulk of the history of the inquisition, although this type of jurisprudence 
was also used by local bishops and Protestants as well. Variou; 
inquisitions can be distinguished on several grounds: whether they were 
Roman or Protestant; whether they were instigated and controlled locally 
or by the Holy Office; whether they were politically, personally, or 
theologically motivated; whether they were aimed at what now seems to 
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be a real issue, such as Lutheranism, or at what now seems a fiction, such 
as witchcraft; whether they were honestly intentioned or somehow 
conupt; whether they were concerned with matters truly internal to 
Christianity or with matters resulting from an inadequate integration of an 
external religious community ( e.g., native religions in the Americas or the 
results of forced conversions in Spain or India). 1 
However, these different inquisitions do have some things in common, 
matters that make it possible for us to see that these are all variants of the 
same thing. The general inquisitorial mode of jurisprudence was an 
inheritance from Roman times. The commitment to confession and the 
willingness to forgive most offenses derive from basic Christian premises. 
These few elements give the inquisition some of its more remarkable 
features: anonymous denunciations (in which the informer is not held to 
penalty if the complaint turns out to be invalid), control of the procedures 
by a churchman who is not necessarily sophisticated about legal subtleties, 
the independence of the inquisition from secular jurisprudence, and the 
ready belief in any confession ( even those concerning otherwise 
implausible matters, such as black magic). The eventual siting of all the 
inquisitions within church bureaucracy makes it natural that the institution 
be controlled by Scripture, Patristic writings, and ecclesiastical practice. 
These elements, combined with the emerging technology of record-
keeping (see Given, especially the early chapters), result in the elaborate 
inquisitorial documents and the careful written specification of required 
practices that have survived to our day. The records, and particularly the 
inquisitorial manuals, are the main sources of information for this paper. 
Reflexive Argument 
A reflexive argument is one in which the only reasonable refutation 
serves to strengthen the original position. 2 This is a three-tum interaction. 
In general, it runs as follows: 
Person A claims C; 
Person B says C is wrong because of reason R; 
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and A replies that the saying ofR counts as evidence in favor of 
c. 
Reflexive argument bears a certain family resemblance to begging the 
question, but differs in important ways. Begging the question occurs when 
one person "draws" a conclusion that was already implicit in his or her 
premises. That is, begging the question is essentially n1onological, and is 
easily illustrated by single-author texts such as editorials or public 
speeches. Reflexive arguments, in contrast, are inherently dialogical. 
They have an interactional form, but they do not have a required fom1 in 
the sense of a system of propositional types. They take their nature more 
from the argument's context than its internal features. 
Here is a non-inquisitorial example. In the 1970s, many large 
midwestem campuses were visited by Preacher Jed, who would go to a 
central public place and begin haranguing passing students for their 
sinfulness. They would heckle, and he would respond. The exchanges 
were often somewhat unkind, proceeding from very different 
understandings. Here is one between a passing student (A) and Jed (J): 3 
A: But you can't speak rationally with any truth. 
J: Oh yes. I can speak rationally. We speak very rationally. 
A: ((laughter)) We can't speak rationally to you though. 
1: We have two basic assumptions. Number one, that there is a 
God and this is His Word. 
A: Defend that assumption! 
1: We don't have to defend our assumptions. 
A: Ohhhh. Okay. That's rational. ((laughter)) How come we 
do? 
We can recast this into canonical fonn, as follows: 
Jed says the Bible is the word of God, and the Bible says 
that A is sinful; 
A denies this, pressing Jed to defend the assumption that the 
Bible is the word of God; 
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Jed concludes that asking for a defense of that assumption 
proves that A is damned. 
From Jed's point of view, any assault on his premises is a further proof 
that his conclusion is right. This is reflexive: all available responses to his 
initial claim "prove" it. 
Reflexive Argument in the Inquisition 
The primary task of this paper is to show the involvement of reflexive 
argumentation in the inquisition. Since I do not want to stimulate higher 
expectations than I can satisfy, however, let me begin by saying that I do 
not frequently find reflexive arguments in inquisitorial transcripts; nor do 
I maintain that it is a required sort of exchange in the inquisitorial 
manuals. Instead, I want to show that this sort of argumentation is always 
in the background, and serves as the ultimate bulwark against risk by the 
inquisition. 4 
The inquisition's purpose was not to determine guilt. Guilt had 
already been decided upon before proceedings were initiated. Certainly 
there are many examples of inquisitions being brought for reasons of envy 
or avarice, but often-perhaps most of the time-I have the impression 
that these determinations of guilt were sincere and careful. Since the 
inquisitors therefore generally took guilt for granted before talking to the 
accused, they did not regard claims of innocence as productive. From the 
viewpoint of the inquisitor, the following things seemed obviously true: 
(1) The best repentance occurs after a voluntary confession. (2) 
Protestations of innocence establish that the sin is deep and the sinner 
hardened. (3) A failure to cooperate with the inquisition displays a sinful 
disrespect for the church militant. This presuppositional background 
makes many sorts of resistance or protest into proof of guilt. Let us 
examine three particular respects in which reflexive argument is at the 
kernel of inquisitorial practice. 
A. Refusal to confess results in harsher punishment. The inquisition 
prized confessions for several reasons. Most prominently, confession is 
the first step toward washing away the stain of the sin. Another reason for 
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the prominence of confession was that a certain number of testimonies was 
generally required for a finding of guilt, and the accused's confession was 
often needed to reach the minimum number. A few people were actually 
released by the inquisition because their refusal to confess left the tribunal 
without enough testimonies. Things rarely worked out that way, however. 
Inquisitions generally began with the inquisitor asking the accused, 
"Do you know why you are here?" If the accused answered with a 
confession that matched the inquisition's documents, matters moved 
forward with some efficiency. However, if the accused made no answer, 
or if his or her answer did not correspond to what the inquisitor was 
expecting to hear, the accused was simply returned to prison for further 
meditation. 5 From the viewpoint of the inquisitor, this was a kindness: it 
gave the person another chance for salvation, another opportunity for an 
unforced confession. Many people spent years in prison, wondering what 
they needed to say, and many died without ever hearing what they were 
supposed to have done. 
Why is this a reflexive argument? Let me break it out into a 
hypothetical exchange that represents what I take to be the inquisitor's 
v1ew: 6 
The inquisitor conveys that the accused is guilty of something; 
The accused says, "I cannot confess, for I do not know what I am 
supposed to have done"; 
The inquisitor concludes that the stubborn refusal to confess is 
proof of unrepentant sin. 
This has the standard reflexive form: an accusation, a denial, and the 
conclusion that the denial proves the accusation. 
B. Claims of innocence prove guilt. A closely related argumentative 
possibility is the constructive claim of innocence. Perhaps the accused has 
been clever enough to figure out the charge, either through r'eflection on 
what others might have deposed or through inference from the inquisitor's 
questions. Perhaps the inquisitor or the accused's advocate has simply 
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explained the charge. The accused might claim not to have done the 
alleged action or might argue that the action does not constitute heresy. 
Though both possibilities are clearly approved by the classical forensic 
doctrines of stasis, both are deadly in an inquisition because both are 
assimilated by the power of reflexive argumentation. 
Here is what happens when one denies the facts that have already 
been proved to the inquisitor's satisfaction: 
The inquisitor says, "You have done X, which is a great sin"; 
The accused replies, "I never did X"; 
The inquisitor replies, "Your obstinate denial makes me fear for 
your soul and proves your guilt." 
A similar argumentative summary can be given for the denial that the 
action was heretical: 
The inquisitor says, "You have done X, which is heresy"; 
The accused replies, "I did X, but it is not a heresy"; 
The inquisitor concludes, "Your disrespect for the church's 
judgments about what affronts t~e faith is itself heretical and so 
doubles your offense." 
Not only were the factual issues beyond dispute, so were the definitional 
ones. 
Besides denying the facts or their definition as heresy, defendants 
n1ight take a third course. Sometimes the accused would offer a 
substantial defense and would atten1pt to excuse the apparently heretical 
action by offering a justification. Perhaps the most famous instance of this 
is Joan of Arc. She was tried for various sorts of obvious sins, such as 
wearing men's clothing anO ~isobeying her parents. Her defense was that 
she did these things in obedience to her visions. The inquisition wraps up 
this argument as follows: "On this point the clerks of the University of 
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Paris and others have considered the manner and end of these revelations. 
the matter of the things revealed, and the quality of your person: and 
having considered everything relevant they declare that it is all false, 
seductive, pernicious, that such revelations and apparitions are 
superstitions and proceed from evil and diabolical spirits."7 Joan's claims 
were never plausible, never to be taken seriously: no divine spirit would 
ever instruct a person to sin, and even J can did not deny that she had worn 
men's clothing and so forth. We can summarize the reflexive form in this 
way: 
The inquisitor says, "You have sinned in violation of 
Deuteronomy''; 
Joan replies, "I did these things in obedience to the revelations 
given to me by the saints in my visions"; 
The inquistor concludes, "Thus you prove you have been an 
agent of Satan, who has impersonated divine creatures." 
Joan's trial, of course, was an essentially political one, and the modem 
reader has little doubt that evidence would have been manufactured or 
ignored if necessary to bring in the proper verdict. But no such 
fictionalization was ever needed, and Cauchon and the others may very 
well have burnt her with clear consciences. Such is the power of the 
reflexive argument. 
C. Assaults on the integrity of the inquisition prove guilt. Not only is the 
reflexive argument a potent offensive weapon, but it was also harnessed to 
defend the inquisition from any sort of criticism. Briefly, to insult the 
inquisition, to resist the inquisition, to critique the inquisition, or to 
illuminate its secrets~all these were self evidence of heresy. Reflexive 
arguments protect the inquisition, both within each particular trial and in 
the outside world of discourse. 
The dangers of an energetic defense are often noted in histories of the 
inquisition. Anyone who counseled the accused to do anything but confess 
was straightforwardly interfering with the inquisition's ability to do God's 
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work. Kiamer and Sprenger's comments (part 3, question 10) on these 
points have a black fascination to them. Certainly the accused can put on 
a defense: "[T]he accused shall as far as possible be given the benefit of 
every doubt, provided that this involves no scandal to the faith nor is in 
any way detrimental to justice .... " We need not pause here for comment, 
because we have already seen what counted as a "scandal to the faith," and 
what might seem "detrimental to justice." These witch-hunting inquisitors 
go on to describe what sorts of counsel are and are not permissible: "(I]t 
should be noted that an Advocate is not to be appointed at the desire of the 
accused, as ifhe may choose which Advocate he will have; but the Judge 
must take great care to appoint neither a litigious nor an evil-minded 
man .... " The advocate is warned to look over the case very carefully, for 
"if he finds it unjust he must refuse it," and in conducting it must avoid 
"introducing legal quirks and quibbles." Just to be fair, "[T]he Judge must 
make the above conditions clear to the Advocate, and finally admonish 
him not to incur the charge of defending heresy, which would make him 
liable to excommunication." In this way, the inquisitor can be confident 
that he will not be contradicted during the trial. 
A similar protection was put in place external to the proceedings as 
well. The workings of the inquisition were generally secret, both as 
regards specific cases and as regards standard practice. The churclunen 
knew how things worked, of course, but for the general public the 
inquisition could be a dark and mysterious thing. Many of those who 
came before the various tribunals were penanced and released, but it was 
common to require them to promise not to discuss what they experienced. 
For instance, Dellon published the penances assigned him, and the last one 
was standard: "He [Dellon] shall be inflexibly reserved as to every thing 
which he has seen, said, or heard, or the treatment which has been 
observed toward him, as well at the Board as in the other places of the 
Holy Office." In fact, this provision aroused enough fear in Dellon that 
even though he was living beyond the reach of the inquisition, he debated 
whether to publish his account and originally represented the author's 
name as D+++. 8 
Whether secrecy was a wise policy or not is well beyond the scope of 
this paper. Here, we need only to notice how this protected the inquisition 
against any risk of effective criticism or any need to defend itself. Roughly 
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the same reflexive argument summarizes what happens either to a vigorous 
defense attorney or an external critic: 
The inquisitor says that a person is guilty of heresy; 
An advocate or external critic says the inquisitor is wrong in 
some way; 
The inquisitor takes note of this self-evidently heretical attack on 
the Holy Office's authority and proceeds to punish it. 
Reflexive argumentation, then, is the essential insulation against irritants 
either within proceedings or beyond them. 
Conclusions 
This paper's central claim is that reflexive argumentation was at the 
heart of the inquisition. This sort of argument form made it possible for 
the inquistion to appear reasonable while, in fact, making real 
argumentation impossible. The inquisition's reflexive arguments all have 
a coherent internal logic about them, so that the church could easily see the 
justice of every move it made. I offer no judgment about whether or not 
the churchmen knew that what they were doing was irrational, because I 
think it is quite likely that they regarded their premises as following clearly 
from Scripture, tradition, and theological interpretation. From those 
premises~ I want to emphasize, the reflexive arguments are all entirely 
convincing. 
It is historically clear that the reflexive arguments worked. That is, 
they convicted people who would not today be found guilty, they set aside 
impertinent defenses, and they served as an effective discursive bulwark 
against otherwise pointed criticisms. The completely reflexive form of the 
arguments is an essential part of this story. However, I have found 
reflexive arguments in other places, contexts in which the reflexive 
arguments were ineffective. What distinguishes the inquisition from these 
other argumentative situations is that in the inquisition, the accused could 
not leave the field. The inquisition possessed and used the power to define 
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the domain of allowable discourse (see Hample, "Pragma-Dialectical"). 
This is a very dictatorial move in a dialogue, and where there is no 
authority behind the framing, the intended victim can simply walk away. 
Both the argumentative form and the power of the church were needed to 
make the inquisition work as it did. 




I A convenient summary of the chronology is in the Oxford Dictionary 
of the Christian Church ("Inquisition"). For general histories of the 
various inquisitions, see books by Peters, by Henningsen and Tedeschi, 
and of course Lea's Hist. lnq. Middle Ages. For the Spanish inquisition, 
see Kamen, and Lea's Hist. lnq. in Spain. The Portuguese inquisition is 
explored by Herculano. Spanish and Portuguese colonial inquisitions are 
treated in Priolkar, in Cervantes, and in Lea's Inq. in Spanish 
Dependencies. Books connecting the inquisition to witchcraft include a 
general study by Russell, a study of Spain's flirtation with witchcraft by 
Henningsen, Hall's collection of documents from the Salem trials, and a 
study of the North Berwick, Scotland trials in the 1590s by Normand and 
Roberts. Maccoby has explored and translated transcripts of thirteenth-
and fifteenth-century "disputations" between Christians and Jews, in which 
the Christians forced the rabbis into an inquisitorial exchange on the 
subject of whether the Talmud proved the divinity of Christ. This brieflist 
omits many of the more specialized studies of specific regions, issues, and 
times. 
2The following material that generally explains reflexive argument is a 
rewriting of the opening portions of Hample ("Reflexive"). A more 
limited treatment is in Hample ("Pragma-Dialectical"). 
3The extract to follow is from transcripts (lines 004 - 033, pp. 140-41) 
reported in Jacobs and Laufersweiler. These interactions between 
Preacher Jed and passers-by are also explored in van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs, chapter 7, as well as in Hample 
("Reflexive"). The last paper points out that this sort of exchange is 
actually doubly reflexive. From the student's point of view, Jed's refusal 
to defend his premise is a proof that the student is right, but to illustrate 
this would be too great a digression at this point. 
4The concept of risk is important to contemporary dialectical theories 
of argument. Briefly, the idea is that each interlocutor must make himself 
or herself vulnerable in an authentic encounter. That is, one cannot 
reasonably set out to persuade another person unless one opens oneself to 
similar exposure. See Brockriede or Johnstone. 
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5This is common to several inquisitorial manuals. Lea generalizes: 
"Persistent denial of guilt and assertion of orthodoxy, when there was 
evidence against him, rendered him an impenitent, obstinate heretic, to be 
abandoned to the secural arm and consigned to the stake" (Hist. lnq., v. l, 
p. 407). Bogue! ( ch. 45) notes disapprovingly that Satan sometimes kills 
witches while they are in prison or causes them to kill themselves. Thus, 
neither silence, nor patience, nor death can do anything but prove the truth 
of the accusation. 
6For an illustration from the point of view of the accused, see Charles 
Dellon's 1687 Relation of the Inquisition of Goa, reprinted in English 
translation by Priolkar. 
7The Trial of Jeanne d'Arc (301). Abelard was also concerned that 
apparent miracles might be the devil's work: see Fichtenau (224). One 
issue in Joan's trial was whethe·r she had consulted clergy about the 
authenticity of the visions. As early as 1022, with the trial of the Orleans 
heretics, the church had worried about how to regard private revelation 
that might be heretical~mystical ones in the case of the Orleans heretics, 
but visions in Joan's trial. See Fichtenau (199-200), for this issue in the 
Orleans matter. Giles also points out that bodily ecstasies experienced by 
women generally had very debatable authenticity in the eyes of the male 
clergy (12). 
The church was often reluctant to argue with heretics, because such 
disputation immediately confers some credibility on the opponent. 
Edwards points out that this was a problem for the Roman church in 
dealing with Lutheranism. Luther's supporters castigated the Catholics for 
not having public disputations with Luther (92-98). Consider this 
reflexive argument: (I) I say that you, the Roman church, are wrong; (2) 
No, we are right for reason R; (3) Your willingness to argue with me 
proves that I have a point. This is not as problematic as some of the other 
reflexive arguments discussed in this paper, but, on Edwards's analysis, it 
appears to be what the Catholics were concerned about. 
The reluctance to argue with heretics was not confined to the Roman 
church. Geis and BuIUl report the Puritan views that the devil can actually 
trick us into not believing in him ( 150, n. 86), and that apparently cogent 
arguments against religion or one of its institutions are clear evidence of 
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Satanic presence (162, n. 27). Both of these, of course, are reflexive 
arguments that absorb the other's view without answering it. 
8The penance is printed in ch. 36 of Dellon. See ch. 4 of Priolkar for 
discussion of the publication of Dellon 's account. Del1on was punished by 
the Portuguese colonial inquisition in Goa, India. His is one of many 
cases in which false charges seem to have been brought because of 
personal animosity. 
The inquisition's insistence that it be completely insulated from 
external criticism is recurrent throughout its history. For instance, Kamen 
(157-61) discusses the Spanish inquisition's interest in Archbishop 
Carranza in about 1565. Kamen notes the opinion among the supporters 
of Carranza that to speak in favorofhim is exactly equivalent to opposing 
the inquisition, and that that was not feasible (161). He quotes Marafi6n, 
as follows: The inquisition's "authority ... would not allow it to admit 
that it had imprisoned Carranza unjustly. The most ardent defenders of justice here consider that it is better for an iJU1ocent man to be condemned 
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